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ELEVATING SUBSTANCE OVER PROCEDURE:
THE RETROACTIVITY OF MILLER V. ALABAMA
UNDER TEAGUE V. LANE
Brandon Buskey †
Daniel Korobkin ††
This Article proposes a unique framework establishing that the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, which forbids states
from automatically sentencing juveniles to life imprisonment without any
meaningful opportunity for release, must apply retroactively to hundreds of
juveniles whose convictions and life sentences were already final at the time
of the decision. Such a framework is timely and critical. The lower state and
federal courts are divided on the question, and the Supreme Court is likely to
settle the issue within the next year.
The Article reviews how, absent guidance from the Supreme Court, a
host of states, led most recently by Michigan, have invoked the Miller ma-
jority’s statement that it was merely requiring states to follow a “certain
process” before sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment without parole. By
this reasoning, Miller is not retroactive under the Supreme Court’s federal
retroactivity doctrine established by Teague v. Lane. The Court has always
applied new substantive rules retroactively under Teague, while it has
never done so for a new procedural rule.
The Article rejects this “process” language as a basis for resolving
whether Miller is retroactive. It concludes that Miller in fact has little to do
with process and is instead primarily concerned with sentencing outcomes
for youth. In striking down mandatory life without parole for juveniles,
Miller adapted the individualized sentencing requirement from Woodson
v. North Carolina, which invalidated the mandatory death penalty. This
individualized sentencing requirement obligates states to always offer
juveniles a sentencing outcome carrying the possibility of release and to con-
sider the essential, mitigating fact of youth before imposing an irrevocable
life sentence. These obligations are inherently substantive. By contrast,
Miller’s alleged procedural component is undefined and collateral to its
substantive altering of juvenile sentencing. Miller therefore announces a
substantive rule that must apply retroactively.
† Staff attorney, American Civil Liberties Union, Criminal Law Reform Project.
†† Deputy Legal Director, American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan.
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INTRODUCTION
“Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of
offenders or type of crime—as, for example, we did in Roper or
Graham. Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain
process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant character-
istics—before imposing a particular penalty.”1
This excerpt comes from Justice Kagan’s majority opinion in
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in the companion
cases Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs,2 which announced for
the first time that imposing mandatory life imprisonment without
the possibility of release on a juvenile offender constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.3
Miller voided the authority of twenty-eight states and the federal
government that required this sentence for juveniles convicted of
murder. By the Court’s conservative estimate, over 2,000 juveniles
1 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 2469.
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had been condemned to die in prison under such regimes.4
Miller dismantled these sentencing schemes in three specific
ways. States must now provide more lenient sentencing alternatives
to life imprisonment without parole for all juveniles.5 They must
also engage in meaningful, individualized consideration of the es-
sential, mitigating fact of youth before imposing a sentence, and
they must do so in a manner that ensures that juveniles will rarely
be imprisoned for life without any meaningful hope for release.6
Miller adapted these functional components for juveniles from the
Court’s prior decision in Woodson v. North Carolina,7 which struck
down the mandatory death penalty and ushered in the modern era
of individualized sentencing in capital cases.8 The Miller Court in-
voked Woodson on the grounds that, for the purposes of Eighth
Amendment analysis, imprisoning juveniles for life without the
possibility of parole is analogous to the death penalty.9
Given Miller’s radical reorientation of juvenile sentencing, Jus-
tice Kagan’s framing of the decision as requiring only a “certain
process” seems curiously timid. Read in context, the majority in-
tended the statement to deflect the dissent’s critique that the
Court had never before invalidated as cruel and unusual a sentenc-
ing practice imposed on so many individuals in so many states.10
However, the majority’s couching of its decision in “process” terms
has catalyzed significant controversy over which of the 2,000 juve-
nile offenders identified in Miller are entitled to relief from the
mandatory life without parole sentences they are currently serving.
The crux of the issue is the doctrine of retroactivity, or
whether states must reopen the cases of those juveniles who have
finished their state appeals and whose convictions are final. Here,
another central character in this national drama emerges: the Su-
preme Court’s 1989 decision in Teague v. Lane.11 Teague draws a
line for retroactivity purposes between those decisions that are
“procedural” and those that are “substantive.” Under Teague, the
Supreme Court has never applied a rule only governing procedure
retroactively, while it has always applied substantive criminal rules
4 Id. at 2477 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
5 Id. at 2467, 2469.
6 Id.
7 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
8 Id. at 301.
9 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463-64, 2466-67.
10 Id. at 2471.
11 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\18-1\CNY101.txt unknown Seq: 4 30-APR-15 14:51
24 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:21
retroactively.12 The significance of Justice Kagan’s quote therefore
becomes readily apparent. If Miller is, as the quote suggests, solely
about process, it is almost certainly not retroactive. If Miller is sub-
stantive, it almost certainly is.
The lower courts are irreconcilably divided on the issue.  Nine
states have ruled Miller retroactive;13 five have ruled it is not.14 Ad-
ditionally, four of the six federal courts that have addressed the
issue have denied retroactivity.15 Despite the obvious split among
the lower courts in the two years since Miller, the Supreme Court
has yet to resolve the dispute.  The Court first denied certiorari re-
view in two cases that squarely presented the issue.16  The Court
then granted certiorari on the question, only to dismiss the case
weeks later after the parties reached a plea agreement freeing the
petitioner and mooting his appeal.17  Most recently, the Court
agreed to hear a second case likely to be argued this fall and de-
cided in early 2016; however a jurisidictional question the Court
raised sua sponte leaves some doubt as to whether it will decide
retroactivity.18
12 See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-52 (2004).
13 Falcon v. State, __ So.3d __, 2015 WL 1239365 (Fla. Mar. 19, 2015); People v.
Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709 (Ill. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 710 (Dec. 1, 2014); State v.
Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 2013); Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y, 1 N.E.3d 270 (Mass.
2013); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698 (Miss. 2013); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716
(Neb. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 67 (Oct. 6, 2014); In re State, 103 A.3d 227 (N.H.
Aug. 29, 2014); Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); State v.
Mares, 335 P.3d 487 (Wyo. 2014).
14 Ex parte Williams, __ So.3d __, 2015 WL 1388138 (Ala. Mar. 27 2015); People v.
Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801 (Mich. 2014); State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829 (La. 2013); Cham-
bers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn. 2013); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d
1 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2724 (June 9, 2014).
15 Compare Songster v. Beard 35 F.Supp.3d 657 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (finding Miller ret-
roactive) and Alejandro v. United States, No. 13 Civ. 4364, 2013 WL 4574066, at *1-2
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2013) (same) with Johnson v. Ponton, __ F.3d __, 2015 WL 924049
(4th Cir. Mar. 5, 2015) (finding Miller is not retroactive); Craig v. Cain, No. 12- 30035,
2013 WL 69128, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013) (per curiam) (same); In re Morgan, 713
F.3d 1365 (11th Cir. 2013) (same), reh’g en banc denied, 717 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir.
2013); Thompson v. Roy, No. 13-cv-1524, 2014 WL 1234498 (D. Minn. Mar. 25, 2014)
(same).
16 Cunningham v. Pennsylvania, 134 S. Ct. 2724 (2014); Tate v. Louisiana, 134 S.
Ct. 2663 (2014); Toca v. Louisiana, No. 14-6381(R46-005); 2015 WL 507612 (Feb. 3,
2015).
17 Toca v. Louisiana, No. 14-6381(R46-005); 2015 WL 507612 (Feb. 3, 2015).
18 Montgomery v. Louisiana, No. 14-280, 2015 WL 1280236 (Mar. 23, 2015).
Along with Miller’s retroactivity, the Court certified a second question: “Do we have
jurisdiction to decide whether the Supreme Court of Louisiana correctly refused to
give retroactive effect in this case to our decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U. S. __
(2012)?”  The question appears directed at resolving whether the Court can apply
Teague to cases on appeal from the denial of state, rather than federal, collateral re-
view. See generally Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008).
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Perhaps nowhere is settling this dilemma more pivotal than in
the State of Michigan. Michigan has approximately 350 juvenile of-
fenders mandatorily sentenced to life without parole.19 After Miller,
the legislature amended its unconstitutional sentencing scheme.
Juveniles convicted of first degree murder now receive a sentenc-
ing range between a minimum term of twenty-five to forty years,
and a maximum term of not less than sixty years.20 The revisions
expose a juvenile to life without parole only after the prosecutor
moves to seek the sentence and the court holds an individualized
sentencing hearing in compliance with Miller.21 But the legislation
contains a catch.  Juveniles finished with their state appeals, fully
334 of the 360 juveniles condemned to die in Michigan prisons,22
cannot be resentenced unless the Michigan Supreme Court or the
United States Supreme Court declares Miller retroactive.23
Subsequently, the Michigan high court denied retroactive ap-
plication of Miller in People v. Carp.24 The court effectively declared
that Miller provides no hope of release under the revised statutes
for nearly every juvenile offender automatically sentenced to life
without parole in Michigan. Resting the result squarely on the
Miller majority’s procedural framing, the court “concluded that
Miller established a new procedural rule that does not ‘categorically
bar a penalty,’ but instead requires ‘only that a sentencer follow a
certain process.’”25
Carp does not represent the end of the tale in Michigan. In
2013, a federal district court in Michigan added its own twist. The
court, in a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging
Michigan’s prior sentencing scheme as applied to juveniles, found
Miller retroactive in the civil and criminal contexts.26 In the court’s
view, “[t]o hold otherwise would allow the state to impose unconsti-
tutional punishment on some persons but not others, an intolera-
ble miscarriage of justice.”27 Rather than ordering resentencings—
a remedy unavailable in § 1983 suits28—the district court man-
dated that Michigan reform its parole system to afford inmates
19 Brief On Appeal of Attorney General Bill Schuette as Intervenor at 3, People v.
Carp, 828 N.W.2d 685 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (No. 307758), 2014 WL 929519.
20 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.25(9) (2014).
21 Id. § 769.25(6).
22 Carp, 852 N.W.2d at 838.
23 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.25a(2).
24 Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801.
25 Id. at 832 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012)).
26 Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568, 2013 WL 364198 at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013).
27 Id. at *2.
28 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).
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whose convictions were final the meaningful opportunity for even-
tual release guaranteed by Miller. The case is pending before the
Sixth Circuit. If successful, the suit would offer a lifeline for the 334
juvenile offenders left behind by the Michigan Legislature and
Michigan Supreme Court.
This Article seeks to undo the morass in Michigan and across
the country by constructing a sound framework for evaluating
Miller’s mandate of individualized sentencing under Teague’s retro-
activity doctrine. Reduced to essentials, the question is whether in-
dividualized sentencing is concerned principally with substantive
sentencing outcomes or solely with sentencing procedures. To an-
swer this question, the Article identifies the three basic obligations
that Miller tailored from Woodson to strike down mandatory life im-
prisonment without parole: 1) altering the range of sentences avail-
able to juveniles charged with murder; 2) requiring consideration
of the mitigating effects of youth for juveniles exposed to life im-
prisonment without parole; and 3) compelling appropriate proce-
dures for the individualized sentencing of youth. From this
analysis, the Article concludes that Justice Kagan’s description of
Miller as requiring only a certain process is inaccurate with respect
to Teague. Instead, Miller announces a substantive rule of individu-
alized sentencing that is integrally concerned with sentencing out-
comes for youth. It should therefore apply retroactively under
Teague to all juveniles inflexibly sentenced to die in prison, regard-
less of when their appeals ended.
Part I reviews the test for retroactivity under Teague. Part II
explores how the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance on substantive
rules of criminal law under Teague has led directly to the current
confusion over Miller’s retroactivity. Part III identifies and evaluates
Miller’s three operational components and concludes that the first
two —altering the range of sentences and requiring consideration
of youth —are outcome-determinative rules of substance, and that
the third component, while procedural, is undefined and left to
the states. Thus, though subsequent Supreme Court decisions ex-
pounding on Miller-compliant procedures may not be retroactive,
Miller itself is.
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE UNDER
TEAGUE V. LANE
When the Supreme Court announces a new constitutional
rule in a criminal case, not every defendant affected by the invali-
dated practice can benefit from the change. “The past,” even the
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unconstitutional past, “cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration.”29 The doctrine of retroactivity governs whether new
constitutional pronouncements apply to past cases. Teague v. Lane
sets forth the Supreme Court’s modern retroactivity jurisprudence.
By the Court’s account, the evil of always applying new rules to old
cases is that it “continually forces the States to marshal resources in
order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals con-
formed to then-existing constitutional standards.”30 The Court de-
veloped the Teague doctrine to protect the states’ interest in the
finality of criminal judgments from being undermined by endless
federal review.
Under this commitment to finality, Teague draws a dividing
line between the stages of direct review and collateral review fol-
lowing criminal trials.31 New rules always apply retroactively to
criminal cases still on direct review,32 a process typically encompass-
ing the first round of appeals granted to defendants as a matter of
right, as well as the additional time within which a state supreme
court or the United States Supreme Court could review the crimi-
nal judgment as a matter of discretion. Once direct review ends, a
defendant’s conviction and sentence are considered final. The de-
fendant then has the option of “collaterally” challenging his con-
viction or sentence by seeking post-conviction relief in the state
trial court and, after exhausting state-court options, filing a peti-
tion for habeas corpus in federal court. Under Teague, defendants
are generally not entitled to the benefit of new constitutional rules
on collateral review.33
The general norm against retroactivity on collateral review
yields if the decision announces a new “substantive” rule. The
Court classifies rules as substantive if they either prohibit the state
from criminalizing certain private behavior,34 or if they “necessarily
carry a significant risk that a defendant . . . faces a punishment that
the law cannot impose upon him.”35 Substantive rules may also cat-
egorically prohibit a punishment for a class of defendant based ei-
ther on the defendant’s status or some characteristic of the offense
29 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Chicot
Cnty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940)).
30 Id. at 310.
31 Id. at 307-10.
32 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004).
33 Teague, 489 U.S. at 310 (plurality opinion).
34 Id. at 307 (plurality opinion) (discussing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,
692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35 Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352 (quotations and citations omitted).
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itself.36 A prototypical example of a substantive rule would be the
Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia,37 which barred the death pen-
alty for the intellectually disabled.38 New substantive rules of crimi-
nal law such as this have always been considered retroactive.
By contrast, new procedural rules, which “regulate only the
manner of determining the defendant’s culpability,”39 do not apply
retroactively on collateral review unless they are “watershed rules of
criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accu-
racy of the criminal proceeding.”40 To qualify, the new criminal
procedure rule must remedy an intolerably high risk of convicting
the innocent.41 Teague warned that the discovery of new watershed
rules was highly unlikely.42 The Court has since never expressly rec-
ognized a watershed rule, though it has suggested that the Sixth
Amendment right of an indigent person to appointment of coun-
sel expressed in Gideon v. Wainwright43 may meet the standard.44
The Court has also not provided an analogous example of a water-
shed rule in the sentencing context. Judging from this precedent,
to label a constitutional rule “procedural” is tantamount to declar-
ing it non-retroactive, while the opposite is true for substantive
rules.
II. THE SUPREME COURT HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE
GUIDANCE ON THE NATURE OF SUBSTANTIVE RULES AND
INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING UNDER TEAGUE
Subsequent to Teague, the Court’s guidance on distinguishing
between substantive rules and procedural rules has been incom-
plete. In Schriro v. Summerlin, the Court explained that the universe
of substantive rules “includes decisions that narrow the scope of a
36 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002).
37 Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
38 Compare Penry, 492 U.S. at 330 (classifying as substantive a decision “that held, as
a substantive matter, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally
retarded persons . . . regardless of the procedures followed”), with Atkins, 536 U.S. at
321 (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally dis-
abled persons).
39 Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 353 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted); see also Shady
Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010) (plurality
opinion) (finding that rule regulates procedure where it “governs only the manner
and the means by which the litigants’ rights are enforced”) (quotations omitted).
40 Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352 (quotations and citations omitted).
41 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 312 (1989) (plurality opinion).
42 Id. at 313 (plurality opinion).
43 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
44 Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990).
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criminal statute by interpreting its terms” and “constitutional deter-
minations that place particular conduct or persons covered by the
statute beyond the State’s power to punish.”45 Taken at face value,
this statement leaves open the possibility of other sorts of substan-
tive rules, yet without offering any definitive way to identify these
rules.
Complicating matters, the Supreme Court often announces
new rules while failing to address explicitly whether they are sub-
stantive or procedural. This development is somewhat surprising.
The Court initially announced in Teague that retroactivity should
be addressed as a threshold matter. The Court did so on the under-
standing that once the Court applies a new rule to a defendant on
collateral review, “evenhanded justice requires that [the rule] be
applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated.”46 On this
analysis, Miller should be applied retroactively because the Court
also announced the rule in the companion case Jackson v. Hobbs,
whose petitioner was on state collateral review at the time of the
decision.47 A number of courts have invoked this circumstance to
support the conclusion that Miller is retroactive.48
However, the Court changed course soon after Teague on
whether to treat retroactivity as a threshold issue. Beginning with
Collins v. Youngblood, the Court has demoted retroactivity to an af-
firmative defense to be raised or waived by the state, rather than a
jurisdictional question or one the Court must otherwise address
sua sponte.49 This retreat from addressing retroactivity as a thresh-
old matter has arguably returned the Court to its pre-Teague days,
when it applied new rules to cases on collateral review without ana-
lyzing retroactivity.50 Today, unless the state invokes the non-retro-
activity defense, or the new rule is of a type previously found to
apply retroactively,51 the fact that the Court applies a novel rule to
45 Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 351-52 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
46 Teague, 489 U.S. at 300 (plurality opinion).
47 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2461 (2012).
48 See, e.g., State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb. 2014) (“[W]e are not in-
clined to refuse to apply the rule announced in Miller to a defendant before us on
collateral review when the Court has already applied the rule to a defendant before it
on collateral review.”).
49 Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990); see also Danforth v. Minnesota,
552 U.S. 264, 289 (2008).
50 See Danforth, 552 U.S. at 272-73.
51 See Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 668-69 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (ob-
serving that multiple Court holdings may “logically dictate” retroactivity where Court
makes clear over a series of decisions “that a particular type of rule applies retroac-
tively to cases on collateral review . . . ”).
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a case on collateral review cannot necessarily affirm that the rule
fits within one of the exceptions to non-retroactivity.
With respect to Miller, the Court’s limited post-Teague jurispru-
dence bears responsibility for the disarray among the lower courts.
The debate has largely centered on whether the rule in Miller pro-
hibits “a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants
because of their status or offense,” as such rules are always re-
garded as substantive under Teague.52 Primarily at issue is what con-
stitutes a class of defendants’ “category of punishment” for
retroactivity purposes. Courts finding Miller retroactive tend to
characterize mandatory-life-imprisonment-without-the-possibility-
of-parole as a distinct category of punishment that can no longer
be imposed on juveniles as a class.53 Courts declaring Miller non-
retroactive instead insist that, irrespective of whether the sentence
is mandatory or discretionary, the defendant’s real punishment is
simply life-without-parole.54 Returning to Justice Kagan’s quote,
these courts then invoke the fact that Miller does not categorically
prohibit juveniles from being sentenced to life imprisonment with-
out parole, and only requires states to follow a “certain process” to
impose the sentence.55 Viewed this way, the defendant’s “category
of punishment” is life-without-parole, and its “mandatory” nature
simply reflects the state’s failure to follow “a certain process”
before imposing it.
The Supreme Court has not provided a definitive basis on
which to resolve this divide. On the one hand, Chief Justice Rob-
erts in dissent stated that “[t]he sentence at issue is statutorily man-
dated life without parole.”56 This framing supports classifying
mandatory sentences as distinct forms of punishment.57
The Supreme Court’s treatment of mandatory sentences in
52 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989).
53 See, e.g., Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“We con-
clude that [Miller] is a new substantive rule that puts a juvenile’s mandatory life without
parole sentence outside the ambit of the State’s power.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
54 See, e.g., People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 826-27 (Mich. 2014).
55 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 2724 (2014) (“Since, by its own terms, the Miller holding does not categori-
cally bar a penalty for a class of offenders . . . it is procedural and not substantive for
purposes of Teague.”) (citations omitted).
56 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2479 (2012) (Roberts, C.J. dissenting).
57 See Penry, 492 U.S. at 330 (“The Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the
infliction of cruel and unusual punishments”) (emphasis added); see also Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The Eighth Amend-
ment stands to assure that the State’s power to punish is exercised within the limits of
civilized standards.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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other Eighth Amendment decisions lends additional corroboration
to this position. The Court has repeatedly characterized mandatory
death sentences, which the Court struck down in Woodson v. North
Carolina, as uniquely punitive.58 In Miller, the Court relied heavily
on Woodson and its progeny, ruling that because juvenile life with-
out parole is “akin to the death penalty,” mandatory life without
parole for a juvenile is likewise cruel and unusual.59
The opposing view is that a mandatory sentence describes the
means for arriving at the underlying sentence, rather than a
unique type of sentence. The Michigan Supreme Court adopted
this stance in Carp, though without confronting any of the Su-
preme Court’s pre-Miller Eighth Amendment caselaw on
mandatory sentences.60 The court’s underlying assumption is that,
while it may be true that a mandatory sentencing scheme is uniquely
harsh and rigid, it does not necessarily follow that individual
sentences resulting from that scheme are harsher than their discre-
tionary counterparts, or that the difference between the schemes is
a matter of substance rather than procedure.
Adding to this confusion, the Supreme Court has never struck
down a mandatory sentencing scheme under the Eighth Amend-
ment outside of Woodson and Miller. And, in part because Woodson
itself was decided thirteen years before Teague, the Supreme Court
has not grappled directly with the question of whether Woodson is
substantive. The Court has, however, struck down capital sentenc-
ing practices under Woodson’s Eighth Amendment rule and subse-
quently deemed these decisions procedural and non-retroactive
under Teague.61 That the Court has declared some of its capital sen-
tencing decisions as procedural indirectly undercuts the assertion
that Eighth Amendment limitations on sentencing invariably im-
pose a categorical bar on a specific punishment. It does not, how-
ever, answer the question of whether a non-categorical limitation
58 See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293 (plurality opinion) (citing consensus of jurisdic-
tions rejecting mandatory death sentences as “unduly harsh and unworkably rigid”);
see also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 332 (1976) (plurality opinion) (finding
automatic death sentences to be of “unacceptable severity”).
59 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463-66.
60 People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801 (Mich. 2014).
61 See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004) (denying retroactive relief to post-Wood-
son holding that a capital sentencing scheme could not require the jury to disregard a
mitigating element unless the jury found the element unanimously); see also Sawyer v.
Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990) (denying retroactive relief to post-Woodson holding that a
sentencer cannot be led into a false belief that the responsibility for imposing death
rests elsewhere).
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on a punishment can be substantive and thus retroactive under
Teague.
This doctrinal stalemate suggests that the key to articulating a
definitive basis for whether Miller is substantive or procedural lies
not in the differences between mandatory and discretionary life
imprisonment without parole. Rather, the key lies in identifying
and classifying the mechanisms through which Miller forces states
to abandon mandatory life imprisonment without parole and
adopt an individualized sentencing scheme. The following Part ad-
dresses these mechanisms and their implications for Miller’s
retroactivity.
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S EIGHTH AMENDMENT REQUIREMENT
OF INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING IN MILLER IS
SUBSTANTIVE UNDER TEAGUE
Miller’s invalidation of mandatory life imprisonment without
parole for juveniles and its requirement that sentencers consider
the mitigating circumstances of youth stem directly from the
Court’s decision in Woodson v. North Carolina.62 Woodson struck
down the mandatory death penalty and required individualized
consideration of a defendant’s mitigating circumstances before a
state may impose the ultimate punishment.63 Miller and Woodson’s
implementation of individualized sentencing share three funda-
mental components: 1) they force states to expand the range of
sentences available to those previously eligible for only the harshest
sentence; 2) they alter the criteria states may permissibly use to
impose maximum sentences under the new regime; and 3) they
require states seeking to retain the maximum sentence to imple-
ment new sentencing procedures to comply with the individualized
sentencing mandate.
With these functional similarities it stands to reason that
courts must afford the same treatment under Teague to the individ-
ualized sentencing rules in both Woodson and Miller. Unfortunately,
as noted above, the Supreme Court has never expressly announced
whether Woodson’s requirement of individualized sentencing
should apply retroactively. Filling this void requires ascertaining if
these fundamental components of individualized sentencing are
substantive or procedural. As discussed below, although the third
component is undeniably procedural, the first two components are
62 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
63 Id. at 304 (plurality opinion); see also Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 75-76
(1987).
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inherently substantive. Individualized sentencing, then, is primarily
a substantive imperative, not merely a procedural requirement.
Miller hence must apply retroactively.
A. Miller’s Requirement That States Alter the Range of Permissible
Sentencing Outcomes for Juveniles Is Substantive
The first necessary requirement of striking down a mandatory
penalty and implementing individualized sentencing is that states
must alter the range of sentencing outcomes available to those sub-
jected to the punishment. Prior to Woodson and Miller, states made
exactly one sentence available to the class of defendants at issue:
life imprisonment with no opportunity for release. Following Wood-
son and Miller, these states had to offer at least one more lenient
sentencing option. Requiring individualized consideration before
sentencing would be meaningless otherwise.
Changing the potential outcomes of a given proceeding is a
classic function of substantive law. This is true whether a state alters
the amount of damages available in a civil suit,64 or shifts the availa-
ble penalties in a criminal prosecution. For Miller, verification of
this principle lies in the fact that changing sentencing outcomes
may occur altogether independently of any particular process: it is
an end unto itself. Because Miller requires states to offer juveniles
at least one sentence carrying the possibility of release, irrespective
of “the fairness of the procedures used to implement them,” the
decision is firmly in the “substantive sphere” as defined by the Su-
preme Court.65
This basic observation exposes the fallacy of the argument set
forth by the Michigan Supreme Court and others that eliminating
the “mandatory” element of a life-without-parole sentence is proce-
dural since defendants can still receive the same sentence, so long
as states follow a different process. What this argument obscures is
that prohibiting a mandatory sentence by definition requires the
state to enact different sentencing outcomes, not simply different
sentencing procedures. This injunction remains regardless of
whether one views a mandatory sentence as a particular category of
punishment or simply a means of arriving at a particular sentence.
64 See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 (1996) (acknowledg-
ing that statutory cap on damages qualified as substantive law under Erie doctrine).
65 Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998); see also Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989) (“[I]f we held, as a substantive matter, that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally retarded persons such as Penry re-
gardless of the procedures followed, such a rule would [be substantive].”).
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To further illustrate why altering the range of possible sen-
tencing outcomes is substantive under Teague, it is useful to com-
pare Miller to Roper v. Simmons,66 the Supreme Court’s Eighth
Amendment decision that categorically bars the death penalty for
juveniles. Roper’s categorical ban on capital punishment for
juveniles is undeniably substantive under Teague.67 But Roper’s cate-
gorical bar represents only part of its function. By outlawing the
death penalty for juveniles, Roper also altered and narrowed the
range of permissible punishments for youth. Miller, though lacking
a categorical bar on juvenile life without parole, nonetheless an-
nounced a rule requiring states to alter and expand the range of
permissible punishments for juveniles to always include one sen-
tencing option that carries the possibility of release. Logic cannot
support the proposition that a constitutional rule narrowing the
range of allowable punishments (Roper) is substantive, but a consti-
tutional rule expanding the range of punishments (Miller) is not.
Both species of rules require states to rewrite their substantive sen-
tencing laws.68
The Michigan Supreme Court in Carp dismissed this argument
on the ground that “a new rule only ‘alters the range’ of punish-
ments available to the sentencer if it shifts the upper limits of the
range of punishments downward such that the previously most se-
vere punishment to which defendants have been sentenced is no
longer a punishment that the sentencer may constitutionally im-
pose.”69 Curiously, shifting the lower limits of the range would not
“alter the range of punishments” under this formulation. The
court’s aim is transparent. Shifting the upper limits of a sentencing
range necessarily requires a categorical ban on the previous maxi-
mum sentence, while lowering the range can never categorically
ban a particular sentence. The court’s response merely recycles the
position that Miller is not substantive because it does not categori-
cally prohibit life imprisonment without parole.
66 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
67 Penry, 492 U.S. at 330 (classifying as substantive “rules prohibiting a certain cate-
gory of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense”); see
also Little v. Dretke, 407 F. Supp. 2d 819, 824 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (“[T]he new rule
announced in Roper is clearly substantive in nature and, therefore, applies
retroactively . . . ”).
68 For this general reason, the United States government has conceded that Miller
is substantive in federal habeas proceedings. See Government’s Response to Peti-
tioner’s Application for Authorization to File a Second or Successive Motion under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 at 10-17, Johnson v. United States, 720 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-
3744).
69 People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 823 (Mich. 2014).
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The Michigan Supreme Court reaches this facially dubious
conclusion through clumsy sleight of hand. Quoting the Supreme
Court’s decision in Summerlin, the court asserts that a sentencing
rule qualifies as substantive only if “the defendant ‘faces a punish-
ment that the law cannot [any more] impose upon him’ in light of
the new rule.”70 However, this quotation is incomplete. A categori-
cal prohibition on the maximum sentence is sufficient for a rule to
be substantive, but Summerlin does not say it is a necessary condi-
tion. Properly invoked, Summerlin makes clear that substantive sen-
tencing rules apply retroactively because they “necessarily carry a
significant risk” that the defendant “faces a punishment that the law
cannot impose upon him.”71
Miller mandated the expansion of sentencing outcomes for
juveniles to reduce this very risk. Despite allowing states to retain
life without parole for juveniles, the Court unequivocally an-
nounced that imposing the sentence on a juvenile will rarely pass
constitutional muster. The Court declared: “[G]iven all we have
said in Roper, Graham [v. Florida], and this decision about children’s
diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we
think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harsh-
est possible penalty will be uncommon.”72 The Court further in-
structed that it is “ ‘the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption.’”73  Consequently, refusing to give Miller
retroactive effect “necessarily carr[ies] a significant risk” that
juveniles serving mandatory life without parole sentences are
“fac[ing] a punishment that the law cannot impose upon
[them].”74 Indeed, the Miller Court recognized precisely this point.
It noted that, because mandatorily incarcerating a juvenile for life
without release removes youth from the sentencing decision “such
a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.”75
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Alleyne v. United
States76 also undermines Carp’s suggestion that a new rule alters the
range of punishments only if it shifts the upper limits of a sentenc-
ing range. Prior to Alleyne, the Court ruled in Apprendi v. New Jersey
70 Id. (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004)).
71 Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352 (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
72 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
73 Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)).
74 Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620
(1998)).
75 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
76 Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
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that, other than a prior conviction, facts that increase a defen-
dant’s sentence beyond the maximum set by statute are elements
of the underlying offense.77 Such “elements” must therefore be
submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.78 The
Court reasoned that “[i]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to re-
move from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the pre-
scribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is
exposed.”79 However, the Court subsequently held in Harris v.
United States80 that facts which increase the mandatory minimum
are merely “sentencing factors,” rather than elements of the of-
fense, and there is no need to prove such facts to a jury.81
In Alleyne, the Court overruled Harris. The Court held that
facts that increase the mandatory minimum sentence are indeed
elements of the offense and must be submitted to the jury.82 Under
Apprendi, identical treatment of raising mandatory minimums and
statutory maximums is necessary because “[b]oth kinds of facts al-
ter the prescribed range of sentences to which a defendant is ex-
posed and do so in a manner that aggravates the punishment.”83
Although raising a mandatory minimum narrows the range of pun-
ishments whereas increasing a statutory maximum expands it, the
Court deemed that distinction immaterial. Facts affecting either
end of the sentencing range constitute offense elements.84
Alleyne is not a decision about retroactivity. Nonetheless, the
Court’s analysis has unmistakable implications for how Miller ought
to be analyzed under Teague. Defining the elements of a criminal
offense is a substantive function, in that it determines what “pri-
mary, private individual conduct” the state may proscribe.85 As the
Court recognized in Apprendi and Alleyne, defining the elements of
an offense also determines a defendant’s sentencing range. Alleyne
thus impliedly stands for the proposition that rules that either raise
the statutory maximum or lower the mandatory minimum are
77 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 484-85 (2000).
78 Id. at 490.
79 Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
80 Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), overruled by Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at
2155.
81 Harris, 536 U.S. at 556.
82 Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155.
83 Id. at 2158 (plurality opinion); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 484
(2000).
84 Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2160.
85 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey
v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part)).
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equally substantive.86
This conclusion reveals that Carp conflicts with Alleyne. Apply-
ing Carp’s reasoning to the question of whether facts that raise the
mandatory minimum are elements of the offense would yield the
result Alleyne rejected from Harris, rather than the result from Al-
leyne. While the Carp majority acknowledges that altering the upper
limit of a sentencing range is substantive, its reasoning demands
that a fact altering the lower limit of a sentencing range would not
constitute an element of the substantive offense. Carp thereby runs
afoul of Alleyne’s determination that altering either the minimum
or the maximum sentence marks a substantive change to the ele-
ments of the offense.
Together, Roper and Alleyne refute any effort to place a one-way
ratchet on the functioning of substantive rules. Whether a sentenc-
ing rule affects the upper or lower limits of a sentencing range is
irrelevant to classifying the rule as substantive. What is relevant is
whether the rule affects permissible sentencing outcomes. Roper
and Miller mitigate punishments by lowering sentencing ceilings
and floors, respectively. Apprendi and Alleyne addressed state sen-
tencing rules that aggravated punishments by requiring the finding
of facts that raised sentencing ceilings and floors, respectively. Both
sets of rules “alter the prescribed range of sentences to which a
defendant is exposed.” Both sets of rules are therefore substantive.
B. Miller’s Requirement that States Consider Mitigation before
Sentencing a Juvenile to Life without the Possibility of Release
Is Substantive
Along with expanding sentencing outcomes for all juveniles
exposed to life without the possibility of parole, Miller’s individual-
ized sentencing mandate contains a second component imported
from Woodson: instituting a new rule of decision for states seeking
to impose the ultimate available sentence. Woodson forced states to
consider a defendant’s mitigation before they could permissibly
impose a death sentence.87 Miller, in turn, makes consideration of
the mitigating effects of youth a necessary prerequisite for a state to
irrevocably condemn a juvenile to a lifetime in prison.88 As with
eliminating the mandatory nature of a sentence, the requirement
86 This proposition remains true even if the constitutional requirement that juries
make such factual findings is procedural, as the Court held in Summerlin. Schriro v.
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 354 (2004).
87 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 208, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion).
88 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (holding that before a state may sen-
tence a juvenile to life without parole “we require it to take into account how children
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of mitigation may appear procedural on its surface. Both elements
speak in part to how states must conduct sentencing. Yet, a review
of Court precedent from the civil and criminal realms also reveals
that the mitigation requirement is substantive.
i. Rules of Decision in the Civil Context
Just as Teague represents the Court’s attempt to demarcate the
boundaries of federalism in criminal law by resort to the distinc-
tion between substantive and procedural rules, the Court has ap-
plied this same distinction in civil cases to achieve the proper
balance between federal and state interests. In the civil context, as
discussed below, regulations that provide the “rules of decision” for
adjudicating individual rights are substantive, whereas those that
merely provide “the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for disregard or infraction of them” are procedural.89
The Court’s decisions evaluating the use of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in diversity cases demonstrate the Court’s ap-
proach to federalism in civil cases. The Rules Enabling Act prohib-
its the Supreme Court from issuing rules of civil procedure that
“abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”90 As a matter of
federalism, this injunction prevents a federal rule of civil proce-
dure from supplanting state substantive law.91 To this end, a fed-
eral rule of civil procedure is valid if it regulates only “the manner
and the means” of enforcing individual rights.92 However, a rule
impermissibly encroaches upon substantive law if it alters “the rules
of decision” that define the scope of individual rights.93
Rules of decision are clearly substantive under this framework.
While they do not alter the substantive range of outcomes, they
nonetheless control which available outcomes are appropriate. For
instance, the Court has deemed substantive so-called “notice-of-
claim” statutes, which are rules of decision that require would-be
plaintiffs to notify potential defendants of an intended suit within a
specified time or face dismissal of the action.94 This classification
are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them
to a lifetime in prison.”).
89 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407
(2010) (plurality opinion) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
90 Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
91 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 406-07.
92 Id. at 407 (quoting Mississippi Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446
(1946)).
93 Id. (quoting Murphree, 326 U.S. at 447).
94 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 152-53 (1988).
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proved crucial in Felder v. Casey, which resolved whether a state’s
notice-of-claim rule was preempted by federal law in a civil rights
action brought in state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. There, the
Court held that a “notice-of-claim statute is more than a mere rule
of procedure. . . ; the statute is a substantive condition on the right
to sue governmental officials and entities.”95 Thus, federal law pre-
empted the state’s notice of claim statute because applying the
state rule would “predictably alter[ ] the outcome” of suits and
frustrate the federal right.
Outside of the federalism context, where civil plaintiffs have
asserted the need for a new rule of decision to prevent the state
from arbitrarily depriving them of a fundamental liberty interest,
the Court has also categorized these claims as substantive. In Con-
necticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, the plaintiff contended that
his inclusion on the state’s sex offense registry violated the proce-
dural component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, owing to the state’s failure to conduct a hearing on “cur-
rent dangerousness.”96  The Court rejected this contention, find-
ing that because inclusion on the state’s registry did not already
require a finding of “current dangerousness,” the plaintiff should
have invoked the substantive component of the Due Process Clause
to invalidate the law as constitutionally arbitrary.97 Conversely, the
earlier case of Foucha v. Louisiana saw the Court rule as a matter of
substantive due process that a finding of current mental illness or
dangerousness was essential to prevent a state from arbitrarily au-
thorizing involuntary commitment.98
Taken together, these civil cases demonstrate that Miller’s re-
quirement of mitigation is substantive. As in the civil federalism
cases, Miller’s mitigation requirement constitutes an outcome-de-
terminative rule of decision that vindicates juveniles’ rights under
the federal Constitution against cruel and unusual punishments.
Miller, by making sentencers treat youth and its attendant circum-
stances as mitigating factors to arrive at the ultimate sentence, im-
poses a substantive condition on the state’s ability to sentence
juveniles to life imprisonment without any hope of release. As in
Doe and Foucha, this substantive prerequisite is specifically aimed at
preventing the constitutionally arbitrary sentencing of youth to this
harshest of permissible penalties.
95 Id. at 152.
96 Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2003).
97 Id. at 7-8.
98 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992).
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ii. “Rules of Decision” in the Criminal Context
Criminal cases follow a pattern analogous to civil rules of deci-
sion that further supports classifying Miller’s mitigation require-
ment as substantive. Supreme Court precedent establishes that new
rules are substantive when they narrow the factual circumstances
under which a criminal sentence may be imposed.99 Similar to
rules of decision that alter the outcome of cases in the civil context,
substantive criminal rules accomplish this narrowing function
when they make consideration of certain facts necessary before a
state may impose a particular sentence. As the Court explained in
Summerlin, one of its holdings would qualify as substantive if it
made certain facts essential to imposing the death penalty.100 The
Summerlin Court thereby held that its prior ruling in Ring v. Ari-
zona,101 that a jury rather than a judge must find beyond a reasona-
ble doubt the existence of an aggravating factor necessary to the
imposition of the death penalty, was procedural.102 State law al-
ready made the finding of certain aggravating facts essential to the
death penalty, while Ring merely regulated “the procedural re-
quirements the Constitution attaches to [the] trial” of those
facts.103 By contrast, had the Court required the states to find new
aggravating facts in order to impose a death sentence, its ruling
would be substantive.104
Applying Summerlin, the Miller rule is substantive. Before Miller,
Michigan’s mandatory scheme gave no consideration to juvenile
status. Miller now makes juvenile status essential to the sentencing
scheme. It does so by requiring states like Michigan to consider
juvenile status and its attendant mitigating circumstances before a
child may permissibly receive a sentence of life imprisonment with-
out parole.105 Moreover, Miller makes plain its narrowing intent.
The decision requires sentencers not simply “to take into account
how children are different,” but also “how those differences counsel
against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”106
Miller thus makes mitigation essential to the punishment, necessa-
rily limiting the factual circumstances under which a state may
deny the possibility of release to a juvenile.
99 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004).
100 Id. at 354.
101 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
102 Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 354.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2013).
106 Id. (emphasis added).
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Expanding on Summerlin, Professor Beth Colgan has offered
the insightful proposal that this substantive feature of Miller is also
reinforced by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Alleyne v.
United States.107 Recall from above Alleyne’s holding that if a fact
increases the mandatory minimum sentence, it must be considered
an element of the offense.108 And recall that in Summerlin the
Court held that if a new rule made a certain fact essential to the
death penalty, the holding would be substantive for retroactivity
purposes.109 Reading Alleyne and Summerlin together, Colgan con-
cludes that Miller effectively makes adulthood an essential element
of any offense that carries a “mandatory minimum” sentence of life
without parole.110 Miller’s conversion of age into an offense ele-
ment is therefore substantive and retroactive.111
Colgan’s reliance on Alleyne, though facially dependent on the
Court making adulthood an element of an aggravated offense, ac-
tually derives from Miller’s requirement that states alter the range
of sentencing outcomes for juveniles. By virtue of being the only
available sentence, life without parole was both the mandatory min-
imum and maximum sentence for juveniles in states like Michigan;
there was no sentencing range. Miller subsequently required these
states to afford juveniles the possibility of at least one additional
sentence with a meaningful opportunity for release. It is this altera-
tion of potential sentencing outcomes for juveniles as a class that
enables Colgan’s argument that adulthood has become an element
of an aggravated offense whose “mandatory minimum” is life with-
out parole.
Indeed, Colgan’s argument would be valid any time the Court
altered a sentencing range by prohibiting a mandatory punishment
for a particular class of offenders. Whatever fact defined individu-
als not in the protected class—i.e, those still subject to the
mandatory penalty —would become an element of the aggravated
offense. To illustrate, if the Court next rules that those with intel-
lectual disabilities may not receive mandatory life without parole,
by Colgan’s thesis, that holding would transform being of ordinary
intellectual ability into an element of the aggravated offense. In
either scenario, the Court is simply removing a class of offenders
107 See Beth Colgan, Alleyne v. United States, Age as an Element, and the Retroactivity of
Miller v. Alabama, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISC., 262, 268-71 (2013), available at http://
www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/discourse/61-17.pdf.
108 Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013).
109 Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 354.
110 Colgan, supra note 105, at 268-71.
111 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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from the mandatory sentencing scheme and obliging states to im-
plement additional sentencing outcomes for that class.
This clarity is necessary to answer fully the question of whether
invalidating a mandatory punishment and requiring individualized
sentencing is substantive under Teague. Colgan’s approach presents
a persuasive and perhaps complete theory for Miller’s retroactivity.
But it does not fully account for why both Miller’s and Woodson’s
sentencing rules are substantive. Applying Colgan’s reasoning,
Woodson prohibited states from maintaining the death penalty as a
“mandatory minimum.” Yet, unlike Miller, Woodson did not carve
out any particular class of defendants from receiving the mandatory
minimum. Woodson therefore did not make any particular fact de-
fining a class essential to imposing the death penalty in the way
that Miller arguably makes adult status a prerequisite to applying a
mandatory minimum of life without parole. Consequently, al-
though Colgan’s theory results in Miller being substantive because
it makes adulthood an element of a mandatory minimum sentence
under Alleyne, the theory fails to answer whether Woodson is retroac-
tive, despite Miller and Woodson imposing the same essential re-
quirements of individualized sentencing.
Colgan’s thesis also cannot help classify Miller’s individualized
sentencing mandate in situations where neither the mandatory
maximum nor minimum is at stake, i.e., where the jurisdiction is
not required to alter the range of possible sentencing outcomes. If
a non-mandatory sentencing range already exists, an individualized
sentencing and mitigation requirement could force states to enact
a new scheme that incorporates mitigation to arrive at outcomes
without altering the range. This could occur if a state allowed a
judge, after considering only the aggravating factors of the offense,
to impose a sentence of either life with or without parole. The Su-
preme Court might then issue a new decision requiring the state to
consider a defendant’s mitigation before sentencing. In this scena-
rio, there is no mandatory sentence at issue, and thus no argument
that the Court made a particular fact an element of an aggravated
offense. Still, from the discussion above, the threshold require-
ment of mitigation would be substantive under Summerlin. While
Colgan’s approach may corroborate the argument that Miller is
substantive under Summerlin, it does not account for the additional
conclusion under Summerlin that the mitigation requirement,
found in both Miller and Woodson, is itself substantive. Given these
omissions, the “adulthood as element” theory is not fully satisfying
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as a tool for assessing whether individualized sentencing is substan-
tive or procedural.
From the above discussion, it is plain that Miller’s mandate of
individualized sentencing for juveniles, like Woodson’s, not only
forces states to expand sentencing outcomes beyond the most se-
vere mandatory punishment, its mitigation requirement also pro-
vides a critical new rule of decision for arriving at sentencing
outcomes under the new regime.  Both of these functions are
substantive.
C. Miller’s Procedural Component Is Undefined and Collateral to Its
Substantive Changes
Having identified two substantive components of Miller’s indi-
vidualized sentencing requirement as adapted from Woodson, it
cannot be denied that the decision also invokes process. After all,
states with mandatory sentencing schemes before Miller must de-
velop new procedures for how they will identify “the rare juvenile
offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”112 However,
a thorough examination of this supposed procedural dimension
further confirms that Miller does not merely regulate process.
Although Miller prohibits a state from exposing juveniles to
life imprisonment without parole unless there is consideration of
youth, it in no way addresses “the procedural requirements the
Constitution attaches” to the consideration of youth.113 States re-
main free to determine “the manner and the means”114 for the
consideration of youth in accordance with Miller’s expansion of
sentencing outcomes and new rule of decision. One therefore
should not conflate the Supreme Court’s statement in dicta that its
decision “requires only that a sentencer follow a certain pro-
cess,”115 with the question of whether Miller should be considered a
substantive or procedural rule under Teague.
More to the point, it is objectively inaccurate to state that
Miller only requires states to follow a certain process.  States must do
far more. They are required to expand the range of juvenile
sentences to always include the possibility of release. They must
also consider youth and its attendant circumstances as mitigating
112 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 573 (2005)).
113 See Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 354.
114 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407
(2010) (plurality opinion) (quotations omitted); see also Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 351-52.
115 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471.
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factors to ensure that the harshest possible sentence is uncommon
and rare.116 Miller’s limits on state authority therefore have little to
do with sentencing procedure and everything to do with sentenc-
ing outcomes.
Further, basing the Teague analysis on the Court’s dicta would
prove too much. Every new substantive rule potentially requires
states to follow “a certain process” to enforce the new right. This
truism simply expresses the necessary interplay between substance
and procedure.117 Blind adherence to the Court’s “certain process”
language would eviscerate the very idea of substantive rules.
For example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Vir-
ginia banned the death penalty for the intellectually disabled.118
The decision’s categorical prohibition on the death penalty for this
class is indisputably substantive,119 yet it is equally indisputable that
the Court delegated to the states the task of implementing appro-
priate procedures to identify members of the newly protected
class.120 States seeking to preserve life without parole as a sentenc-
ing option for juveniles face a similar task following Miller, namely,
legislating procedures that satisfy the individualized sentencing
mandate.
This interplay between the substantive constitutional rule and
the procedures constitutionally required to enforce the rule can be
observed in the decisions following Woodson. In the wake of Wood-
son, states maintained vastly different procedures for implementing
the Court’s requirement of individualized sentencing in death pen-
alty cases.121 A contrast may therefore be drawn between, on the
one hand, the Court’s rulings outlawing the mandatory death pen-
alty and, on the other hand, the Court’s later rulings regulating the
processes by which states implemented individualized capital sen-
116 See State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d. 107, 115 (Iowa 2013) (“From a broad perspec-
tive, Miller does mandate a new procedure. Yet, the procedural rule for a hearing is
the result of a substantive change in the law that prohibits mandatory life-without-
parole sentencing.”).
117 See Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
118 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
119 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989) (classifying as substantive the rule
subsequently declared in Atkins), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
120 See Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1347 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“Atkins
Left Procedural Rules to States.”).
121 Compare Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding
Texas capital scheme of posing to sentencing jury three questions because nature of
one question allowed defendant to submit any mitigating circumstances), with Proffitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding Florida capital scheme
of directing judge and advisory jury to consider enumerated mitigating
circumstances).
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tencing schemes. The analysis advanced in this Article would de-
mand providing Woodson full retroactive effect as a substantive rule.
It further dictates that the Court correctly held that its latter deci-
sions reviewing Woodson’s implementation through specific sen-
tencing schemes were procedural.122
Miller, as was the case with Woodson, recognized the right to
individualized sentencing for a class of defendants without dictat-
ing specific procedures for vindication of that right. Future debates
in the states over Miller-compliant processes for considering mitiga-
tion are certain to follow. That states must explore these mecha-
nisms does not alter the fact that Miller itself articulates a
substantive rule, and that states must comply with Miller for all of
the juveniles whose sentencings that decision rendered
unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Miller requires that states seeking to incarcerate juveniles with-
out any hope of release do so rarely, and only after conducting an
individualized sentencing where the circumstances of youth—im-
maturity paired with the capacity for change—are given mitigating
effect.  Prior to Miller, this hopeless sentence was anything but rare,
having been inflicted on over 2,000 juveniles. Worse still, life im-
prisonment with no possibility of release was most frequently im-
posed by judges powerless to consider anything except the bare
fact of conviction.
An honest assessment of Miller demands that the overwhelm-
ing majority of youth condemned to die in prison deserve a mean-
ingful opportunity for release at some point in their lifetimes.
Nonetheless, five states, including Michigan, have determined that
because the Miller majority characterized the decision as only re-
quiring a “certain process,” Miller announced a procedural rule
that is not retroactive under Teague v. Lane. Unless the United
States Supreme Court declares otherwise, the overwhelming major-
ity of youth that these states have condemned to die in prison may
never have an opportunity at redemption.
The discussion in this Article establishes that states like Michi-
122 See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004) (denying retroactive relief to post-
Woodson holding that a capital sentencing scheme could not require the jury to disre-
gard a mitigating element unless the jury found the element unanimously); see also
Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990) (denying retroactive relief to post-Woodson hold-
ing that a sentencer cannot be led into a false belief that the responsibility for impos-
ing death rests elsewhere).
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gan have proceeded on a false premise. Irrespective of the lan-
guage used in the Miller majority’s opinion, the decision does not
simply require a “certain process.” Miller, like its doctrinal prede-
cessor Woodson, is principally attuned to sentencing outcomes, not
sentencing procedures. Miller’s individualized sentencing mandate
forces the states to abandon their previously inflexible sentencing
regimes in order to drastically reduce the number of juveniles dis-
carded as “throw away” people. Teague demands classifying Miller as
a substantive decision that binds the states retroactively.
